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2Financial Intermediation and Equity Investment with Costly Monitoring°
1. Introduction
As is well known, competitive equilibria of OLG economies may be inefficient even when
markets are complete.  The competitive equilibrium of a productive economy may not be
Pareto optimal because of overaccumulation of capital (Diamond, 1965):  in dynamically
inefficient economies, the introduction of either a tax-transfer scheme, as a pay as you go
social security system, or public debt allows for an increase of welfare.
When uncertainty and market incompleteness are present in the economy,
intergenerational transfer policies have also the role of providing risk sharing services.
Young agents invest in a risky productive activity to be able to consume when old.  In
absence of a mutual fund, social security or public debt provide a risk-free way to transfer
wealth over time. The same task could as well be undertaken by financial intermediaries,
which collect deposits and lend to a large number of firms, thereby perfectly diversifying risk.
This paper studies the efficiency of equilibria in a productive OLG economy with
asymmetric information.  The model draws on Reichlin and Siconolfi (1996): consumers
allocate their disposable wealth between equity shares and (bank) deposits, and firms have
access to a random technology, whose input can be financed either by selling shares to
consumers or by loans.  However, while Reichlin and Siconolfi (1996) consider the effects of
adverse selection,1 here the economy is affected by ex-post moral hazard due to costly state
verification: output is freely observable only by firms, while lenders have to pay some
monitoring costs to observe its realization (Townsend, 1979; Williamson, 1987). As in
Diamond (1984), costly state verification would allow to derive endogenously the existence of
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3financial intermediaries (banks) acting in the economy as delegated monitors of lenders.
However, we simply assume that direct lending is not available, and that firms can only
borrow from banks.  As a result, the cost of monitoring affects the deposits interest rate,
which in the model is strictly less than the expected return on shares.
In this framework, the introduction of a tax-transfer scheme (e.g. social security) by
the government may be welfare improving even when the economy is dynamically efficient:
in fact, when monitoring is too costly, the government could establish a pay as you go social
security system (or issue public debt) in order to replace the risk-sharing activity provided by
financial intermediaries. The reason for this result is that, in a market economy, social security
and bank deposits develop essentially the same role. A benevolent government should decide
to use only the instrument whose returns allow for higher consumption opportunities.
Although the economy is affected by asymmetric information and market
incompleteness, the inefficiency of competitive equilibria might also be related to additional
factors.  To analyze these effects, we define a notion of constrained Pareto optimality, that
assumes that market incompleteness cannot be eliminated and that the planner is subject to the
same information structure of the individuals in the market economy.  We show that, in the
case of a productive economy, the Constrained Pareto Optimum and the competitive
equilibrium are characterized by different allocations of the instruments. The reason is that
banks' profit maximizing behaviour is privately efficient, but socially inefficient.  In
particular, competitive banks' best response to firms declaring bankruptcy is to adopt
stochastic verification procedures and a severe punishment for dishonest firms. However, the
planner internalizes the fact that firms are owned by consumers and act in the interest of the
latter.  From a social point of view, it is never optimal to punish firms too harshly.  At a
Constrained Pareto Optimum,  firms are subject to deterministic monitoring when they
declare bankruptcy, but the optimal level of punishment is lower than the one chosen by
competitive banks.  Financial intermediation provided by profit maximizing banks is then
responsible for the inefficient outcome of the competitive equilibria.
4The paper is organized as follows.  In section 2, we present the model and describe the
partial equilibrium financing game played between representative firms and banks. Section 3
deals with general equilibrium and optimal government policies, while Constrained Pareto
Optimality is the object of section 4. Conclusions follow.
2. The model
2.1 Agents.
We study the stationary states of a simple general equilibrium OLG model in which
consumers, firms, banks and the government are present.  There is a continuum of identical
consumers, uniformly distributed on the [0,1] interval. They live for two periods, and
population is assumed to be stationary.  Each consumer is endowed with W units of a non
storable physical good when young, but she likes to consume only when old.  When young,
consumers are taxed by an amount TÎ[ ]0,W  chosen by the government, who transfers the
revenues to currently old people.  In the first period of their lives, consumers face only a
portfolio problem:  they have to choose how to allocate their after-tax endowment (W-T) in
two existing assets; more precisely, consumers can buy equity shares by endowing firms with
some amount of capital K, or they can buy deposits (D) supplied by financial intermediaries
(banks). Equity shares pay a state contingent rate of return, which depends on the outcome of
production.  We make the following simplifying assumption:
Assumption 1:  Each consumer can directly invest in equities of only one firm.2
A continuum of ex-ante identical firms is uniformly distributed on the [0,1] interval.
Each firm starts with no endowment but has access to a stochastic linear technology such that
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5X units of capital input return  aX  units of output  (a >1) with probability q, and  0  with
probability 1-q.  Investment returns are i.i.d. across firms.  When firms are endowed with K
units of capital from households (K is then the amount of stocks acquired), they can borrow  L
= X - K from banks.  Let R be the gross rate of interest that firms have to pay back when
production is positive;  with probability (1-q), instead,  the firm goes bankrupt and nothing is
due to the bank.
There is a finite number of competitive banks.  These are assumed not to be able to
buy stocks.  Banks collect deposits from households and are the only agents in the economy
able to perfectly diversify their portfolio by lending to a large number of firms;  for this
reason, the law of large numbers guarantees that bank deposits are a safe asset returning a
fixed interest rate to consumers.
The economy is characterized by ex-post moral hazard, as banks can observe the
realization of the investment process only if they accept to pay a monitoring cost, indicated
with letter g and assumed proportional to the loan amount.  The lending conditions of the
financial contract between banks and firms are studied in the next subsection.
2.2 The financing game.
Consider the game between a representative firm and a representative bank.  The firm
demands a loan, whose cost is set by the bank, and activates its production technology.  The
outcome of production is private information of the firm; the latter decides whether to report it
truthfully to the bank or lie (cheat).  The bank receives the report.  If the investment project is
reported to have been successful, the loan is repaid and the game ends.  Instead, if the firm
declares bankruptcy, the bank has to choose whether to trust the report, or pay the monitoring
cost and obtain full knowledge of the investment outcome. Both players are assumed to be
able to randomize on their available pure strategies. We will look for a Nash equilibrium of
6this game, where each player chooses his optimal strategy in order to maximize his expected
profits, given the opponent's choice.3
In a Nash equilibrium, banks will adopt a monitoring strategy.  Otherwise firms have
an incentive to report the realization of the "bad state" independently of the effective outcome
of production.  We will show that, as in Bernanke and Gertler (1989), the optimal monitoring
strategy of the banks involves stochastic verification procedures, that is banks monitoring
firms declaring bankruptcy with probability less than 1.  In order to prove this, it is sufficient
to show that a deterministic monitoring strategy can never be part of a Nash equilibrium of
this game. The argument runs as follows. Observe that firms never have an incentive to
misreport the outcome of production if banks play their proposed (deterministic) equilibrium
strategy, as they will always be monitored.  Then, firms never misreport.  Now, it is obvious
that banks are not playing a best response to the proposed equilibrium strategy of the firms,
because when they costly monitor reports announcing bad outcomes there is nothing left to
recover.  Hence, deterministic monitoring is not optimal,4 and the financing game does not
have any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.  However, the game has a finite number of players
and the set of available strategies is finite: this implies that a Nash equilibrium does always
exist if one allows for mixed strategies.   Let  m  and  p be respectively the probability that a
firm cheats by reporting the bad state when a positive outcome is realized, and the probability
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7of banks monitoring when bankruptcy is declared.  Moreover, let  V denote the punishment to
a firm that does misreport and is monitored by the bank.  Then, we have:
Proposition 1  A mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the financing game is:
L* = D* ,   V* = a (K + L),   R* = a,    m*=(1-q) gL / q[aK + (a-g)L] ,   p* = L / K+L.
Proof  Firms will maximize their expected profits by optimally choosing m and the desired
amount of loans L.  Banks will try to maximize their objective function by inelastically
supplying their deposits and controlling for p, V and R, the gross interest rate on loans.  When
choosing the punishment level V, banks are subject to a limited liability constraint:
V £ a(K+L), meaning that the punishment cannot exceed the outcome of production.
Let  P be profits from production. The firms' problem is formally written as follows:
FP:  Max E q K L RL V
L,
( ) ( )
m
a m mpP = + - - -1
In the good state, firms realize output, pay back the loan plus the charged interest if they do
not cheat, and are punished by an amount V in the case they cheat but are monitored (this
happens with probability mp).
In this game banks are price takers on the deposits side.5  Thu , th  banks’ problem is:
BP:      
Max EP qRL q V L q L ID
s t V K L and L D
R Vp
m
, ,
( ) ( ) ( )
. . ( )
= - + - - - -
£ + £
1 1
where  EP  denotes banks' expected profits, and  I  the gross interest rate due on deposits.
8with probability m), banks recover V only when they monitor (with probability ); in this
case, they also have to pay the cost of state verification.
Monotonicity of EP with respect to R and V implies that these variables are set at their
maximum levels. Then,  V* = a (K+L).  This allows to rewrite the objective functions in
problems  FP  and  BP  as
(1) [ ][ ]E q K R L RL K LP = + - + - +a a m pa( ) ( )   
(2) EP = qRL(1-m ) + p [qm a (K+L) - qm g L - (1-q) g L] - ID
In order to optimally select  m and p,  maximization of (1) and (2) implies that
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         with    H = qm [ a K + (a  - g L) ]  - (1-q)g L7
The only intersection of the above reaction functions implies m*Î(0,1) and p*Î(0,1).8
Hence,  from  J = 0  and H = 0  we obtain
(5)p
a
*
( )
=
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(6) m *= [ ]
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g
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7 H is the difference between the expected revenues and the cost of monitoring.
8One should notice that this result was already obtained in the informal reasoning preeceding Proposition 1.
9The demand for loans is
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   From (7), it is clear that the maximum level of R that banks can set is R* = a. Hence,
we also have  p * = L / (K+L).  Since the demand for loans when R* = a is not determined,
the model is closed by letting equilibrium loans be equal to the amount supplied. Then, L* =
D.        
In equilibrium banks monitor randomly.  This creates an opportunity for firms to
misreport good outcomes with a positive probability. Moreover, the optimal monitoring
probability increases with the amount of the loan and decreases with K.  Analogously,
straightforward differentiation of (6) shows that m* i increasing in L and decreasing in K.
3.  General Equilibrium.
3.1 Existence of a competitive equilibrium.
Consumers save in their first period of life and consume when old. Consumption tomorrow is
a stochastic variable depending on the realized returns of the first period saving choice. We
assume that preferences of our consumers are continuous and strictly monotone. More
precisely, we also require that the following holds:
Assumption 2:  Preferences are represented by a continuous utility function u(.) which is twice
continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave, and satisfies
lim '( ) , lim '( )
c c
u c u c
® ®¥
= ¥ =
0
0
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Let   ~z  be the stochastic gross return on stocks and W-T  the after tax endowment of
units of the non storable good.  Our consumers face the standard problem of
CP: Max Eu c
K D,
(~)
 s.t.     K+D = W-T
           ~c  = T + I D + ~z K
K,D ³  0
whose first order condition is
      (8)    
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When choosing D optimally, consumers take  I  and  ~z  as parametric:  ~z  has the following
distribution:
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In fact, buying stocks pays back nothing if the bad state of the world is realized or if  the firm
cheats but is monitored: the cumulative probability of this event is (1-q)+qmp.  With
probability q(1-m) instead, stocks pay back exactly a, while the most profitable gross return is
a(K+D) / K, whose probability is equal to qm(1-p).  The expected gross return on stocks is
aq.9
Free entry in the banking sector requires the equilibrium level of  I  being determined
by the zero profit condition.  In equilibrium,
                                         
9 This can be derived after substituting for the optimal probability choices derived in section 2.
11
[ ]( )
( )
( )
9 1
1
I q
q D
q K D
= -
-
+ -
é
ë
ê
ê
ù
û
ú
ú
a
g
a a g
Since our consumers preferences satisfy A sumption 2,  E(~z ) > I is a necessary
condition for an interior solution  (K, D) >>0:  (9) guarantees that this condition holds.
Definition   A stationary equilibrium for the model economy is an array of rates of return
(I,~z ), probabilities (m,p), portfolio allocation (K,D) and loans L such that:
i)  loans are equal to deposits;  ii) banks have zero expected profits; iii) consumers maximize
expected utilities and firms expected profits;  iv) the goods market clears.
Proposition 2  For any TÎ[0,W), there exists a stationary equilibrium for the competitive
productive economy (aq > 1), with  (K,D) >> 0.
Proof    Let F(D,.) =  E[u'[T + ~z  (W-T-D) + ID](I - ~z )]. F is continuous in D. From (8), a
competitive equilibrium is either D* = 0,  F(0,.) £ 0, or D*>0 and F(D*,.) = 0.  Let T Î[0,W).
If D=0,  K=W-T, and future consumption is equal to T with probability (1-q), and to  T +
a(W-T) with probability q.  Then,  F(0,.) = [(1-q)] I u'(T) - q (a-I) u'(T+ a(W-T)) >
> u'(T) [(1-q) I - q (a-I)] = 0.
If D = W-T, K=0 and F(W-T,.) = u'[T+I(W-T)] (I-E(~z )) < 0.  By continuity of F(.) there
exists a (K*,D*)>>0, such that F(K*,D*) = 0.  (K*,D*) is the competitive equilibrium.     •
Equilibria of productive economies (aq > 1) are characterized by the contemporaneous
existence of financial intermediation and equity investment. Financial intermediation provides
risk sharing services to risk averse consumers. However, costly state verification implies that
banks do not monitor with probability equal to one firms reporting bad outcomes.  If a firm
misreports a positive outcome and it is not monitored, its shareholders receive a high return.
Equity investment will then also be positive.
12
3.2 Optimal policies. 
In this economy the government can optimally establish the amount of social security T.
Because of market incompleteness, risk aversion and costly monitoring, the optimal policy
produces results which deviate from the standard Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965)
conclusions.  In particular, in our model it could be welfare improving to introduce social
security (or issue public debt) even when the economy is dynamically efficient, that is when
the expected return on capital is greater than population growth (E( ~z ) = aq > 1).10 The
reason is that financial intermediation and social security develop essentially the same role,
that is they provide risk sharing services to risk averse consumers who cannot perfectly
diversify their equity holdings.11 
4. Constrained Pareto Optimality.
Competitive equilibria of OLG economies may be subject to different sources of inefficiency:
they can be dynamically inefficient because of overaccumulation of capital, or inefficient
because of lack of complete portfolio diversification in a context of uncertainty at the
                                         
10See Azariadis and Smith (1993) and  Reichlin and Siconolfi (1996) for similar results in the context of models
with adverse selection. In particular, Reichlin and Siconolfi (1996) found that it is also possible to obtain
different conclusions from the ones obtained under perfect information even when the economy is dynamically
inefficient.  In fact, they can show that in a credit-rationing equilibrium a la Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) of an OLG
stationary economy, the introduction of a new asset (debt, social security or outside money) could be welfare
reducing when the rate of return on capital is lower than population growth.
11 Define l = 
a g
a a g
( )
( )
1-
+ -
q D
K D
.  If the economy is dynamically efficient but a q < 1 + l ,  then  I < 1, and the
return on deposits is lower than the one on T.    Hence, if  aq = 1 + e, with e arbitrarily small, provided that
consumers are sufficiently risk averse, they will be strictly better-off by consuming  T* = W  with probability
equal to one,  with respect to any other consumption allocation resulting from a portfolio of two safe assets (T,D)
with returns respectively equal to  1 and  I <1, and a risky asset (K) with expected return 1 + e.  Wh naq >1 + l,
equation (9) implies that the safe gross return on deposits is strictly greater than 1.  In this case, deposits strictly
dominate T, and social security should be optimally set to zero; financial intermediation and equity investment
will instead be active.  Clearly this case, for given values of the parameters a and q, is more likely the lower the
monitoring cost  g.
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individual level: in this second case, once market incompleteness is eliminated, equilibria turn
out to be Pareto optimal.
When economies are also subject to asymmetric information, the inefficiency of
market clearing allocations is usually related to the agents' behaviour in a way which can be
distinguished from market incompleteness (Azariadis and Smith, 1993). Hence, even by
assuming that market incompleteness cannot be removed, one could try to establish whether
market equilibria satisfy a weaker notion of efficiency than Pareto optimality. This notion will
be called Constrained Pareto Optimality, and it is derived under the assumption that the
planner cannot introduce additional assets and is subject to the same information structure of
the individuals. Therefore, we give the following
Definition  A Constrained Pareto Optimum is an allocation (K,D,T) such that the expected
utility of the representative consumer is maximized, subject to the resource allocation
constraint, individual budget constraints, and the informative constraint that the planner
cannot freely observe outcomes of production activity.
Notice that when aq £ 1, the Pareto efficient allocation (and a fortiori the Constrained
Pareto Optimum) is trivially T* = W, which corresponds to the optimal policy in the market
economy.  Henceforth, we limit our attention to dynamically efficient economies where aq >
1.  The social planner can try to achieve his or her target by controlling the portfolio
allocation (K,D,T), the supply of loans (L), the interest rates on loans and deposits (R,I), the
punishment to the firm when this is caught cheating (V), and the probability (p) of monitoring
when bad outcomes are reported.  Moreover, contrary to the representative consumer, the
planner internalizes the effect of his (her) savings and monitoring choices on the assets'
returns.  The planner's problem can then be written as follows:
14
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 and the relevant non-negativity constraints.
     Obviously, L = D since in the model there is no other asset in which banks' liabilities
can be invested.  The planner has also to consider two additional constraints. The first is due
to the fact that  m  is  optimally chosen by firms, that is
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 The second is the resource constraint, est blishing that the sum of aggregate (average)
investment and consumption has to be equal to aggregate production plus aggregate
endowments minus the amount of resources destroyed in the monitoring activity.  Since there
is a continuum of individuals, by the law of large numbers, the resource constraint is
(11) E( ~c ) + (K + L) = W + a q(K+L) - p g L
Observe that (11) uniquely determines I.  In fact, since
(12) E(~c ) = T + IL + E(~z )K,  and
(13) E(~z )K = aq(K+L) - qmpV - q(1-m)RL,
one easily obtains
(14)   IL = q(1- m )RL +q m p V -p g L.
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The other assets' returns are:  T pays back 1 (gross) for sure, while capital investment gross
returns are                    
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0 1
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Hence, consumption opportunities in the four states of nature are:
 c1 = T + IL w.p.  1-q
c2 = T + IL + a (K+L) - V w.p.  qm p
c3 = T + IL + a (K+L) - RL w.p.  q(1-m )
c4 =  T + IL + a (K+L) w.p.  qm (1-p )
Claim 1  For any  m *Î [0,1), the expected utility of consumers is strictly increasing in R.
Proof    If  m*=1, EU(~c ) is not affected by R.  Now, assume m* Î[0,1).
Then IL = qRL-pgL.   By simple differentiation, d[EU( ~c )]/dR  > 0.      Ž
Since d[EU( ~c )]/dR ³ 0  ( > 0 for m*¹1), the optimal value of R is greater or equal to
a.  However, if R > a, the demand for loans drops to zero since firms are profit maximizers.
Hence,  Claim 1 implies  R* = a.
Claim 2  Let g be arbitrary small.  Then, at a Constrained Pareto Optimum, V *= a L  and p *
=1.
Proof    Suppose that g = 0, and let m* Î(0,1).12  Hence, from equation (10) and Claim 1,
                                         
12This is without loss of generality.  A similar argument can be applied for m*= 0, or for m* = 1.
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pV =  aL.  Moreover, a change in V only affects consumption opportunities c2  and c4, as
well as their probabilities.  Hence, the optimal choice of V should maximize the expected
utility of consumption in these two states.  Observe that c2 = c4 - V.  The problem can then be
written as
  Max
L
V
U c V
L
V
U c
V
a a
( ) ( ) ( )4 41- + -
By concavity of U(.), simple differentiation gives   dEU( ~c )/dV
|g =0
  < 0.  Hence, V should be
set at its lower feasible bound.  Since p £ 1, V* = aL, and p* = 1.  Since dEU( ~c )/dV  is a
continuous map of the cost  g, and since  dEU( ~c )/dV
|g =0
  < 0, for g small enough, the
inequality holds true. Ž
Notice that, independently of m, c nsumption opportunities can be rewritten as
c1 = T + IL w.p. 1-q
c2 = T + IL + a K w.p.  q
where I = aq - g.  Therefore:
Proposition 3   If  g  is small, and  a q - g > 1, the Constrained Pareto Optimum calls for no
tax-transfer policy (T*=0) and strictly positive levels of equity financing and bank lending
(K*, L* >>0).  Moreover,  R* = a , V* = a L* and p * = 1.
Proof   Obvious.   Ž
Corollary   If  a q - g  < 1, the Constrained Pareto Optimum is instead L*=0,  (K*,T*) >>0.
Remark 1  A Constrained Pareto Optimum is characterized by deterministic
monitoring, at least for small monitoring costs. The distortion in the market economy is
induced by banks behaving as profit maximizers.  Competitive banks monitor firms declaring
17
bankruptcy with probability less than one, and they punish cheating by setting V = a(K+L).
However, firms are owned by consumers and act in their interest.  From the consumers' point
of view, deterministic monitoring dominates any stochastic verification procedure, while for
the banks only the latter is supported by profit maximization. This affects the returns offered
by the assets and the incentives to choose the optimal portfolio allocation. The banks' profit
maximizing behaviour is then responsible for the inefficient outcome of the competitive
equilibria.
Remark 2  Even though, when monitoring is not too costly, market outcomes and the
Constrained Pareto Optimum are both characterized by the active use of the same instruments
(L and K),  the equilibrium allocations are different.  Moreover, there is no optimal policy in a
market economy which can induce banks to monitor with probability equal to one when
bankruptcy is declared. Hence, this kind of market equilibria inefficiency cannot be
eliminated by using traditional macreoconomic policies.  In order to restore the efficient
outcome, the policymaker should act as a regulator of the microstructure of private
contracts.13
5. Conclusions.
This paper investigates the efficiency properties of a productive OLG model subject to ex-
post moral hazard in the form of costly state verification. Competitive equilibria are
characterized by banks adopting stochastic monitoring of bankruptcy reports, and firms
having an incentive to lie.  The optimal policy of the government introduces a social security
system under more general conditions than in the perfect information case.   We show that
market outcomes can fail to achieve even a weaker notion of efficiency than Pareto
optimality, which is derived under the hypothesis that market incompleteness cannot be
eliminated.  This result depends on the role of profit maximizing financial intermediaries:
                                         
13 In our example, the policy maker should require the lending contract  to be designed so as to include
deterministic monitoring of bankruptcy reports.
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these adopt stochastic verification procedures which are privately optimal, but socially
inefficient in an economy with private ownership.
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